Luisa Maldonado v. Atty Gen USA by unknown
2011 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
4-7-2011 
Luisa Maldonado v. Atty Gen USA 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2011 
Recommended Citation 
"Luisa Maldonado v. Atty Gen USA" (2011). 2011 Decisions. 1481. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2011/1481 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2011 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 10-1855 
 ___________ 
 
 LUISA MALDONADO, 
        Petitioner 
 v. 
 
 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
   Respondent 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Petition for Review of an Order of the  
 Board of Immigration Appeals  
 (Agency No. A95 828 715) 
 Immigration Judge:  Honorable Frederic G. Leeds 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 23, 2011 
 Before:  SLOVITER, CHAGARES and WEIS, Circuit Judges 
  (Opinion filed: April 7, 2011)   
 ___________ 
 
 OPINION 
 ___________ 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 Luisa Maldonado, a native and citizen of the Dominican Republic, petitions 
for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) denying her motion 
to reopen her immigration proceedings.  For the reasons that follow, we will deny the 
petition for review. 
  Maldonado came to the United States in 1991 as a visitor.  In 2002, she 
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married a United States citizen.  The following year, Maldonado adjusted her status to 
that of a conditional permanent resident based on her marriage.  Maldonado and her 
husband filed  a joint petition to remove the conditions on her residence in 2005.  The 
Department of Homeland Security, however, denied the petition and terminated 
Maldonado’s status, having concluded that she and her husband failed to establish that 
the marriage was entered into in good faith and not to procure her entry to the United 
States as an immigrant.  In 2006, a notice to appear was issued charging that Maldonado 
was subject to removal from the United States as a result of the termination of her 
conditional permanent resident status. 
  After a hearing, an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) concluded that the 
Government met its burden of proof to establish that Maldonado’s marriage was not 
entered into in good faith.  The IJ ordered Maldonado’s removal to the Dominican 
Republic.  On appeal, the BIA decided that Maldonado’s conditional permanent resident 
status was properly terminated and affirmed the order of removal.  The BIA noted 
numerous inconsistencies in the evidence, including discrepancies in the couple’s tax 
filings and inconsistencies in their testimony. 
  Maldonado then filed a motion to reopen her immigration proceedings, 
asserting that her husband had taken deliberate steps to prevent her from showing that the 
marriage was entered into in good faith.  Maldonado sought reopening in order to apply 
for adjustment of status under provisions of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 
(“VAWA”), which afford relief for aliens who are victims of domestic abuse at the hands 
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of United States citizen spouses.  In support of her motion, Maldonado submitted several 
documents, including her affidavit, medical notes dated March 7, 2007, and invoices 
reflecting payments to a psychological center.  
 In denying the motion to reopen, the BIA decided that Maldonado failed to 
establish prima facie eligibility for adjustment of status.  The BIA explained that 
Maldonado was required to show, among other things, that her marriage was entered into 
in good faith, that she and her husband had shared a joint residence, and that her husband 
had subjected her to battery or extreme cruelty.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(iii); 8 
C.F.R. § 204.2(c).  The BIA concluded that the evidence of record together with the 
evidence submitted in support of the motion to reopen failed to make this showing.   
 The BIA explained that it had previously affirmed the IJ’s decision that 
Maldonado’s marriage was not entered into in good faith, that the evidence cast doubt on 
whether she and her husband had shared a residence, and that Maldonado’s new evidence 
did not offset the evidence of record.  The BIA also found that Maldonado did not 
provide any objective evidence supporting her allegations that her husband had subjected 
her to battery or extreme cruelty and noted that the medical report she had submitted 
appeared to be inconsistent with the allegations in her affidavit.  This petition for review 
followed. 
 We must first address the Government’s argument that we lack jurisdiction 
over the petition for review.  The Government contends that we lack jurisdiction because 
the BIA’s decision that Maldonado failed to establish the requisite battery or extreme 
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cruelty was a discretionary decision not subject to judicial review, and absent jurisdiction 
to review this decision, we also lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s other 
determinations.  The Government recognizes that we retain jurisdiction over colorable 
constitutional claims and questions of law, but argues that Maldonado has presented no 
such question in connection with the BIA’s determination that she failed to establish 
extreme cruelty.   
 We conclude that it is unnecessary to decide our jurisdiction to review the 
BIA’s decision that Maldonado failed to establish battery or extreme cruelty for purposes 
of reopening her proceedings because, as discussed below, her brief presents colorable 
constitutional claims and questions of law for our review.  Although we ultimately 
conclude that these questions lack merit, they are sufficient to confer jurisdiction over the 
petition for review.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D). 
 Maldonado first contends that the BIA applied the wrong legal standard in 
deciding whether her marriage was entered into in good faith, an element of her prima 
facie case for adjustment of status.  She argues that the statute requires that the marriage 
was entered into in good faith “by the alien,” 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(iii)(I)(aa), and 
that the BIA failed to focus on whether she entered into the marriage in good faith, as 
evidenced by its reliance on its earlier decision denying the joint petition with her 
husband to remove the conditions on permanent residence.   
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 As noted by the Government, the BIA stated in its decision that Maldonado 
was required to show that “her marriage to her husband, Mr. Maldonado, was in good 
faith.”  A.R. at 3 (emphasis added).  In addition, the BIA’s decision reflects that it did not 
decide that Maldonado could not make the requisite showing based on the finding in the 
proceedings on her joint petition.  Rather, the BIA considered the documents submitted 
by Maldonado and concluded that the new evidence did not offset the evidence of record 
regarding the bona fides of her marriage, which cast doubt on whether she and her 
husband lived together.  In light of the evidence presented in support of the motion to 
reopen, which as to the bona fides of the marriage primarily consists of Maldonado’s 
statement, Maldonado has not shown that the BIA applied the wrong legal standard. 
 Maldonado also argues that she was deprived of due process because the 
BIA failed to make an individualized determination in her case.  Relying on our decision 
in Zheng v. Attorney General, 549 F.3d 260 (3d Cir. 2008), Maldonado contends the BIA 
made conclusory statements about the insufficiency of the evidence and failed to conduct 
any meaningful analysis of the evidence submitted in support of her motion to reopen.  In 
Zheng, we remanded the matter to the BIA because the BIA had failed to discuss most of 
the evidentiary record in its decision denying reopening.  Id. at 269.  
 The BIA’s decision reflects that the BIA made an individualized 
determination in Maldonado’s case.  On the issue of the bona fides of her marriage, the 
BIA addressed a spousal support order Maldonado had submitted in support of her 
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motion to reopen and explained that the order only established the legality of her 
marriage.  Although Maldonado faults the BIA for failing to address her statement that 
her husband lied in the prior proceedings to make it appear that their marriage was a 
sham, the BIA acknowledged this allegation in its decision.  The BIA did not further 
discuss Maldonado’s statement that her husband had lied, but she has not shown that she 
was prejudiced by any failure by the BIA in this regard.  Maldonado’s allegations that her 
husband lied in the prior proceedings are unsupported.  In addition, Maldonado’s 
allegations primarily concern the fact that she was unaware of the contents of her 
husband’s tax filings and other actions he had taken, which the BIA found raised 
questions as to whether Maldonado and her husband lived together.   
 The BIA also addressed in its decision Maldonado’s affidavit and medical 
notes  dated March 7, 2007, which she submitted to support her claim of spousal abuse.  
The BIA found the documents inconsistent as to when Maldonado claimed she 
discovered that her husband was unfaithful.  The BIA further noted that Maldonado 
stated that her husband forced her to engage in a certain sexual activity, but the medical 
notes stated only that she refused to engage that activity with her husband.  Contrary to 
Maldonado’s argument, the BIA thus explained why her evidence did not support her 
claim that she was subject to battery or extreme cruelty.    
 Maldonado also asserts that the BIA’s conclusory statement that she failed 
to provide objective evidence supporting her claim of battery or extreme cruelty offends 
due process in light of the evidence of her ongoing psychological treatment.  To the 
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extent Maldonado is referring to the invoices reflecting payments to a psychological 
center, we find no error in the fact that the BIA did not address these invoices, as they do 
not support the conclusion that Maldonado was subjected to battery or extreme cruelty.
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  Accordingly, we will deny the petition for review.  
 
 
  
                                                 
1
  To the extent Maldonado also argues that the BIA erred by failing to cite in its 
decision any cases addressing the VAWA or involving similar facts and law, Maldonado 
has not established any error in this regard. 
